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Abstract 
Integrated safety and security assurance for complex systems is difficult for many technical and 
socio-technical reasons such as mismatched processes, inadequate information, differing use of 
language and philosophies, etc.. Many co-assurance techniques rely on disregarding some of these 
challenges in order to present a unified methodology. Even with this simplification, no 
methodology has been widely adopted primarily because this approach is unrealistic when met 
with the complexity of real-world system development.  
 
This paper presents an alternate approach by providing a Safety-Security Assurance Framework 
(SSAF) based on a core set of assurance principles. This is done so that safety and security can be 
co-assured independently, as opposed to unified co-assurance which has been shown to have 
significant drawbacks. This also allows for separate processes and expertise from practitioners in 
each domain. With this structure, the focus is shifted from simplified unification to integration 
through exchanging the correct information at the right time using synchronisation activities. 
Introduction 
Large technological systems produce new capabilities that allow innovative solutions to social, 
engineering and environmental problems. This trend is especially important in the safety-critical 
systems (SCS) domain where we simultaneously aim to do more with the systems whilst reducing 
the harm they might cause. Although there are many advantages to using these new capabilities, 
there is also an increased risk associated with this kind of innovation. The lack of previous data 
and the poor understanding we have of complex system interactions mean that there is an 
exponentially large number of risks to evaluate and a high level of uncertainty. However, SCS still 
need to be assured against risk and, in many cases, certified before use. 
There has been work done to create ontologies and technical mappings between the safety and 
security (Firesmith, 2003), yet this is still far removed from providing us with a basis for 
integrating the two attributes and producing a workable solution. Part of the problem is the 
heterogeneity of safety and security philosophies, principles and standards. They are so different 
that it becomes difficult to establish common ground for communication of assurance risk. It is in 
this context that we consider whether a principled approach relying on assurance cases can provide 
the necessary structure for bringing the two domains together.  
In this paper we discuss the technical and socio-technical aspects of the safety-security challenge. 
A concise outline a candidate solution to these challenges is proposed: the Safety-Security 
Assurance Framework (SSAF). Projected outcomes of the framework and next steps are also 
discussed. 
The Safety-Security Challenge 
Technical Aspects of the Challenge  
The technical challenge describes the difficulties of integrating the two attributes in practical terms. 
Traditional methods for safety assurance and security assurance have been predominantly 
independent with little interaction through the system development life-cycle (SDLC). This is 
problematic because there can be little confidence in the safety argument of a system if security 
considerations have not been made (Bloomfield, Netkachova, & Stroud, 2013). In addition, the 
siloed approach leads to a conflict of concerns, and the impact on the system is detected much later 
on in the process when change is more costly. To ameliorate this negative effect several analysis 
methods and standards have been developed. The following subsections describe a subset of state-
of-the-art solutions that have been applied to industrial case studies:  
Analysis Methods. Identifying both safety and security risks during the SDLC is difficult 
as there may be insufficient information to perform traditional risk analyses. These methods 
describe approaches to integrating safety and security processes: 
Security-Aware STPA. The Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) (Leveson, 2004) is 
extensively used in industry. STPA-Sec (Young & Leveson, 2013), and STPA-SafeSec (Friedberg 
et al., 2017) extend the STPA safety process to include security considerations. A key advantage 
of utilising this process is that practitioners are already familiar with it and can immediately include 
additional steps to account for security risk. However, when applied to a real-world automotive 
case study (Schmitter, Ma, & Puschner, 2016) STPA-Sec was found to have significant limitations. 
The top-down approach was most applicable during the concept-phase of the SDLC but was 
insufficient on its own to satisfy all the co-assurance requirements. 
Security-Aware HAZOP. SAHARA (Security-Aware Hazard and Risk Analysis Method) 
(Macher et al., 2015) is a HAZOP-like analysis for structured brainstorming with additional 
guidewords for security. A clear advantage of this method is that practitioners from both domains 
work together directly using shared concepts and terms. However, this method is time and 
resource-intensive due to the practicalities of organising the process and participants. It also 
assumes that everyone in the room has the right level of competency for the task. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Integrated Fault and Attack Trees (Fovino, Masera, & De Cian, 
2009) have been used to consider the interaction of malicious deliberate acts with random failures 
quantitatively. This analysis has been extended to include mitigations against some of the identified 
attack vectors (Kordy, Piètre-Cambacédès, & Schweitzer, 2014). The unambiguous semantics of 
using methods based on fault trees to represent both faults and threats has many benefits such as 
enabling practitioner to better understand some of the goals of the attacker. These methods suffer 
from similar limitations to FTA, where it is difficult to model dependency. This may lead to 
misidentification of attack paths which undermine the analysis. 
Dependability Analysis. Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA) is an analysis method 
used to identify potential failure conditions from the perspective of each quality attribute 
(Despotou, Alexander, & Kelly, 2009). DDA gives a multi-attribute perspective of the on the bow-
tie analysis concept and thus provides a methodical way of identifying the links between safety 
and security failure conditions through the use of guidewords. Case studies of this methodology 
have been effective for complex systems (Despotou, 2007). The limitations of DDA include an 
over reliance on the participating practitioners to be know the impact of effects; in addition it is 
unclear how new results might be included during operation. 
Architectural Method. The Architectural Trade-Off Analysis Method (ATAM) (Kazman et 
al., 1998) is a human-centric process for identifying risks early in the SDLC. It requires the 
software architects designing the system to gather and establish how a particular architecture 
satisfies given quality goals, and how the attributes trade off against each other. Typically, this 
process takes place over four days (Medvidovic & Taylor, 2010). This method is resource intensive 
and is usually most applicable during the design stage. 
The last two methods are qualitatively different in their objectives to those preceding them, 
however they demonstrate the diversity of solutions available to this this problem. These analyses 
present a first step to integrated assurance. As briefly shown through the limitations of each of the 
methods, there remain several open problems that need to be resolved. In particular, it is unclear 
how to incorporate new security threat intelligence during the operational phase of the system 
without re-evaluating the entire system. This may not be possible, especially in light of the fact 
that several major security patches take place over a shorter period of time than it would take to 
perform the analyses. 
Risk Evaluation. The risk aspect of the technical challenge is not independent from the 
analyses presented in the previous section. It is arguably the most difficult aspect of the technical 
challenge, therefore warrants its own discussion. The safety-security risk evaluation problem is 
how to measure, analyse, propagate and reason about risk. Large, complex systems increase the 
amount of uncertainty about system behaviour therefore making it difficult to accurately reason 
about risk especially using traditional causal models. In response to this problem there have been 
attempts in research and industry to create resources to understand and evaluate risk. Resources 
that include international cyber security incident reporting and monitoring (Johnson, 2015), 
frameworks to analyse sources, types, targets and motivations of attacks (Kshetri, 2005), and 
methods for evaluating damage from cyber attacks (Lala & Panda, 2001; Kundur et al., 2010) 
especially where they are linked to physical attacks. The following sections outline some of the 
key contributors to the risk evaluation challenge: 
Definition of Risk. There is currently no widely accepted cross-domain definition of risk for 
safety and security. There are some conceptual models that include the two attributes (Firesmith, 
2003), however these are insufficient to tackle the issue of risk propagation. Where safety risk is 
often characterized by severity and likelihood, security risk is characterised by many more factors 
such as impact and motivation. It is also more difficult to make a likelihood estimation for threats.  
Quantitative Risk Measure. Researchers have attempted to use probability as a measure 
(Aven, 2007) and evaluate risk with a variation of probability risk assessment (Taylor, Krings, & 
Alves-Foss, 2002). However, the uncertainty in estimating risks precluded having a single, 
meaningful quantitative measure. Instead of being used as a direct measure, probability and 
likelihood can be used effectively to indicate the amount of confidence required for the assurance 
of a system, or sensitivity analysis. For example, opportunity and access can be used as a predictive 
indicator for likelihood of attack and managed according to the desired assurance level.  
Qaulitative Risk Measure. There exist alternative qualitative measures for risk that have 
been widely used such as Common Criteria evaluation assurance levels (ISO/IEC, 2017) for 
security, and development assurance levels for safety (RTCA, 2012). These have proved useful 
when reasoning about individual attributes within specific domains but there has been no widely 
adopted or sophisticated integrated measure. It is important to note that a one-size-fits-all 
measurement that acts as magic bullet in unifying safety and security risk is not an adequate 
solution. Too much important information about uncertainty is discarded when these kinds of 
methods are adopted rendering them unfit for the purpose of accurately reasoning about risk. 
Instead, what is needed is a more nuanced way to reason about risk and track uncertainty.  
Risk Communication. The communication of risk is related to the quantitative vs qualitative 
question. The lack of standardised models across domains leads to misunderstandings, lost 
information and asynchronous duplicate processes. Some research has been done into combining 
safety and security processes (Kriaa, Pietre-Cambacedes, Bouissou, & Halgand, 2015), 
argumentation approaches (Lautieri, Cooper, & Jackson, 2005), and controlled vocabularies for 
safety assurance (Attwood, Kelly, & Conmy, 2014). This work has predominantly been with just 
one of the attributes as the focus e.g. security-informed safety. In addition, many of the techniques 
have not shown adequate consideration to how teams currently work.  
Risk Representation. Part of the communication problem is that it is unclear what 
constitutes a joint model or representation of risk. Both domains are over-reliant on expert 
knowledge which is often represented as text-based documents that are difficult to parse and update 
when change needs to be incorporated. Communication of expert knowledge is often ad-hoc or 
rigidly prescribed with little flexibility, such as with some of the technical analysis methods 
discussed earlier. The problem is further compounded by the lack of a shared language and 
terminology between teams, and lack of synchronised development techniques during the system 
lifecycle. As a result, with time, analysis models diverge and the link between safety and security 
becomes increasingly obscured. The trade-off therefore is unclear and a whole systems approach 
is almost impossible because the relevant information is provided long after the engineering 
decisions it would have influenced. 
Evolving Threat. This aspect of the risk challenge is related to the increased cyber-security 
threat from activist, criminal and state-sponsored groups which are organised, have many resources, 
are highly motivated and can stage sophisticated attacks (Symantec, 2018). These attackers are 
able to exploit the increased number of attack vectors which result from greater system complexity 
e.g. increased zero-day vulnerabilities, as well as tried and tested methods e.g. spear phishing. 
Cyberterrorism remains poorly understood (Kenney, 2015) but still poses a unique and urgent 
threat to critical national infrastructure and SCS as it allows for greater damage to be done than 
using traditional weapons. Despite the abundance of work in this area there is still no consensus 
as to what the threats are or their impact. What is needed, therefore, is a way to reason about  cyber 
risk that allows system development to progress without ignoring uncertainty and losing 
information that might be resolved at a later stage or with new technology or increased resources.  
In addition to aspects of the technical challenge already mentioned, there has research which 
recognises some of the subtle interactions between safety and security (Lautieri, Cooper, & 
Jackson, 2005; Amorim et al., 2015). There has also been work done to reconcile safety-critical 
and high security functional requirements (Tomlinson et al., 2015), extend safety-security 
workflow tools (Schmittner, Althammer, & Gruber, 2015), combine safety and security in 
industrial control systems (Kriaa et al., 2015), extend the concept of assurance cases to security 
(Finnegan & McCaffery, 2014), and create complementary standards and codes of practice. 
However, there are no widely applied solutions for how to synchronously develop safety and 
security arguments during the system lifecycle, what information to share and how or when to 
share it. What is missing still is a fundamental philosophy, unifying language and standard set of 
practices for engineers to use during the system development. The next section discusses some of 
the socio-technical problems that arise due to this deficit. 
Socio-Technical Barriers to Co-Assurance 
In the previous section the technical difficulties of combing safety and security were discussed. 
These aspects are extensively covered in the literature, however in real-world systems they do not 
appear in isolation. Instead, they are part of an overall engineering process that is subject to drivers 
other than the technical. Therefore, no sustainable solution will be implemented without also 
addressing the socio-technical aspects of the challenge. The following discussion is not meant to 
be exhaustive, but it does provide an illustrative set of key areas that any solution would need to 
be address:  
Trade-Off. Unlike other system quality attributes e.g. reliability, availability, maintainability, 
etc., security poses a unique challenge to safety as it is not only a question of architectural and 
design trade-off. There exist more subtle ways in which arguments for safety are undermined and 
undercut by security threats (Bloomfield, Netkachova, & Stroud, 2013). This subtle interplay is 
not yet fully understood, and has not been fully addressed in current research. It can be thought of 
on different levels of abstraction: 
Conceptual Trade-Off. Safety engineering has been established for more than 70 years and 
the conceptual framework that it works within is fairly mature. Techniques and language are fairly 
well established even if there is some debate within the domain. This, in addition to the fact that 
safety often takes precedence during the development of SCS, leads to an oversimplification of 
security assurance that lacks sufficient appreciation of what makes security risk reduction difficult. 
It is not enough to simply apply extant techniques from safety. Table 1 shows a few differences in 
philosophies that would affect the engineering and assurance processes. A fundamental difference 
is that safety is often non-negotiable and what is meant by ‘harm’ is fairly clear. Security ‘harm’, 
on the other hand, is less clear and dependent on the perspective. It is often about committing risk 
reduction resources proportionally to threats. It is much more difficult to assess whether a security 
goal has been attained. 
Table 1 — Key Differences in Philosophies 
Safety Security 
 predominantly values domain openness, 
collaboration, transparency 
 assumes accidents happen as a result of 
random and unintentional failures 
 assumes a benevolent operator 
 
 security-through obscurity and 
information hiding are valid controls 
 assumes a space of adversarial 
competition with fast-evolving threats 
from intelligent attackers who have 
potentially infinite attack vectors 
 
Organisational Trade-Off Considerations. Within organisations the safety and security 
communities are often physically separate. The practitioners in each domain tend to specialise in 
very detailed but often disparate knowledge. This becomes problematic when conflicting concerns 
need to be resolved. In addition to the physical separation, there is often a mismatch in the number 
of engineers on projects. Safety teams are often well-established and relatively large compared to 
the small security teams which have fewer practitioners with the right competency level (Bird, 
2017; Ullrich, 2016). This presents many practical problems, such as security engineers may not 
be able to attend as many meetings as the safety team which would greatly affect some of the 
analysis methods described in the previous chapter. 
Trade-Off Considerations for Individuals. Understanding the implications of trade-off is 
difficult because it requires an understanding of complex interactions, and needs a practitioner to 
access higher creative cognitive functions. It can be argued that it is unlikely that a practitioner 
from a single domain would have the oversight and authority to make judgement calls about impact 
in another domain on their own. If this were attempted then any results would likely be subject to 
several biases, such as confirmation bias and the Dunning-Kruger effect (Dunning, 2011) which 
can lead to overconfidence in a safety argument because of a lack of understanding of security, for 
example. A large part of understanding security relates to the attacker and their motivations. The 
next section explores some of the difficulties introduced by having an adversary. 
Adversarial Nature of Security. Previous sections have discussed security being in an 
adversarial space. The presence of an intelligent attacker means that conflict with safety cannot 
only be resolved through trade-off alone. In many cases the adversarial nature of attackers causes 
a relationship where security is inversely proportional to safety. For example, safety certification 
requires a transparent argument that a system will perform its intended function in a safe way. This 
argument structure provides potential attackers with a clear blueprint of system weaknesses and 
attack vectors. It is often the motive, not means that explains the absence of an attack. The 
implications are that there is a greater need to understand the security argument of a system and 
the reasons to have confidence in it in order to better understand security risk. 
Proportionality. The concept of proportionality is not a new one in system assurance. It 
defines the view that the measures taken and resources allocated to control risk and must be 
proportional to the magnitude of the risk itself (Zakaszweska, 2016). There are several aspects of 
the risk management process that proportionality affects, namely the amount of dedicated process, 
how much time is afforded to risk management, the competence that is required, the detail of 
evidence and the level of assurance. Existing technical solutions to the safety-security challenge 
do not seem to consider all proportionality aspects. With reference to competence, it is often 
assumed that the practitioners performing the analysis are suitably qualified, however for security, 
one of the top challenges consistently identified is lack of skills (Bird, 2017; Ullrich, 2016). 
The aim of providing this very brief, but detailed discussion of the key problems identified for the 
safety-security challenge is to draw attention to the challenges and gaps in knowledge that still 
exist. This is important when creating a new solution, in order to avoid being subject to the same 
limitations. 
Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) 
Having enumerated the existing techniques to solve the safety-security challenge, and discussed 
the socio-technical issues surrounding the problem, in this section a candidate solution that 
attempts to address some of these problems is proposed. This is the Safety-Security Assurance 
Framework. 
Independent Co-Assurance as a Solution 
The many reasons why safety and security assurance cannot remain predominantly independent 
have already been discussed. So, too, have the reasons why the attributes cannot be simply unified 
in one assurance process. A better candidate solution is one that lies between the two extremes, 
that allows for independently running assurance activities, but has synchronisation points where 
risk information is propagated. This model of activity is what is being defined as independent co-
assurance. In order for this approach to be successful and effective, it requires a common base. 
Thus, to achieve this common understanding, the safety assurance principles previously identified 
from standards (Hawkins, Habli, & Kelly, 2013) have been applied to security with the following 
outcome: 
1. Software security requirements shall be defined to address the software 
contribution to system vulnerabilities. 
2. The intent of the software security requirements shall be maintained throughout 
requirements decomposition. 
3. Software security requirements shall be satisfied. 
4. Vulnerabilities introduced by software behaviour shall identified be mitigated. 
4+1. 
 
The confidence established in addressing the software security principles shall 
be   commensurate to the contribution of the software to system risk. 
  
Whilst this is seemingly an exercise in renaming the principles from safety to security, the 
implications are a greater. It creates a common assurance argument structure which can be used as 
the basis for communication during indpedendent assurance activities. It changes co-assurance 
activities from a process of integrating safety and security in very specific ways at very specific 
times, to a question of activity synchronisation that allows for greater flexibility. In addition, this 
solution uses the model-based system engineering paradigm (Wymore, 1993) to integrate safety 
and security assurance activities with each other, and with the SDLC. It functions by allowing 
safety and security teams to work separately, but defines points at which they must share 
information to produce an integrated assurance case. This is a highly innovative solution because 
it aims to keep the benefits of working in specialised teams whilst still producing an integrated 
assurance argument for the system. This principle-based approach ultimately is a lot more suited 
to real-world application where assurance of the attributes is unlikely to be at the same rate or by 
the same team. 
What is SSAF? What does it consist of?  
The solution, as illustrated in Figure 1, consists of: 
Process 
 steps to develop an integrated assurance argument structure 
 points of communication during system development 
 a method of risk propagation and management 
 steps to configure or restrict information sharing 
Models 
 a meta-model for safety and security assurance artefacts 
 common argument patterns for safety and security 
 examples of links between the artefacts generated form particular methodologies 
Language 
 ontology of terms and concepts 
 a method for standardising language and terminology used during assurance 
 
 Figure 1— Proposed Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) 
How will SSAF be implemented? 
SSAF makes use of the UML-based standard for structured assurance cases: Structured Assurance 
Case Metamodel (SACM) (OMG, 2018). This will allow models to be built that include detailed 
information about artefacts generated from specific activities by participants. These artefacts will 
also relate to particular claims. Relations between the artefacts from each of the assurance activities 
will then be created, and these would be the vehicles for impact propagation e.g. when a 
vulnerability artefact is changed, any hazard artefacts related to it will be updated. 
Synchronisation 
This candidate solution provides a process for separate safety and security assurance and expertise, 
but facilitates synchronised co-evolution through the SDLC. This framework will allow for 
controlled information sharing and directly addresses several aspects of the safety-security 
challenge. It allows for better communication using the same language and terminology. This will 
limit the separate analyses from diverging from each other. The traceable link through the lifetime 
of the system is maintained in this way. 
Attribute Co-existence 
The SSAF aims to go beyond simple high-level issue flagging or updates on measures. It will 
provide a way to reason about the subtle ways in which claims interact with each other through 
their associated artefacts. It is an improvement on existing methods because it makes it necessary 
to articulate claims in a standardised form. This, in turn, allows practitioners to evaluate risk and 
impact at a deeper level which does not obscure information.  The solution also formalises how 
system and safety-security assurance models relate to each other, this creates the potential for 
partial automation through model-based practices that are already established. 
Expected Outcomes from SSAF 
The primary outcome of the SSAF is that the safety and security arguments are made explicit and 
linked to the system model so that justifications and impact are clearer. These argument structures, 
represented as models, will also be used as the primary source of information for certification and 
accreditation. Over time it is expected that patterns for the structures will be derived. 
The advantages of this solution include, but are not restricted to, that it will harness the emergent 
benefits and capabilities of new technology without counteractively restricting activities. The 
impact, trade-offs and uncertainty of safety-security interactions will be more traceable. The 
solution will enable better arguments to be formed, and enable better decisions regarding the 
system because the uncertainty related to an argument are presented in a transparent way. It is not 
a one-size-fits-all representation of risk that is blindly applied to all situations. Rather, it enables 
risk measures to be applied to safety and security arguments with a degree of confidence which 
can be revisited at a later stage, this allows for more sophisticated reasoning. 
 Conclusions 
This paper has discussed some of the major challenges and gaps in knowledge related to safety 
and security assurance of large, complex systems. These gaps related to the differences between 
safety and security communities, how to represent and reason about risk, and how arguments can 
be represented as models. The safety-security assurance framework (SSAF), was presented as a  
candidate solution to these challenges which aims to create a process for synchronising the 
independent assurance of safety and security, and create a more sophisticated and nuanced way to  
reason about impact. The SSAF has the potential to positively change the way safety and security 
communities interact with each other, especially when developing large, complex systems where 
uncertainty is high. As a result it is possible that the systems become safer and more secure as a 
result of this framework. 
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